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Abstract. Currently, short signature is receiving significant attention
since it is particularly useful in low-bandwidth communication environ-
ments. However, most of the short signature schemes are only based
on one intractable assumption. Recently, Su presented an identity-based
short signature scheme based on knapsack and bilinear pairing. He claimed
that the signature scheme is secure in the random oracle model. Unfor-
tunately, in this paper, we show that his scheme is insecure. Concretely,
an adversary can forge a valid signature on any message with respect to
any identity in Su’s scheme.
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1 Introduction
In traditional public key cryptosystems, a digital certificate which guarantees
the authenticity of the relationship between a public key and its owner needs to
be produced by a Certification Authority (CA). It brings the certificate man-
agement problem since such a system requires a large amount of computing
and storage cost to deal with distribution, verification, renewal and storage of
the certificates. To overcome this problem, Shamir [1] introduced the concept
of identity-based (ID-based) public key cryptography in 1984. In this setting,
a user’s public key can be determined by his identity (e.g., his name or email
address) and his secret key is generated by a trusted third party called the
Private Key Generator (PKG). Therefore, ID-based cryptosystem is more con-
venient than traditional one and carries great weight in cryptography research
community.
Currently, ID-based short signature is receiving significant attention since it
is particularly useful in low-bandwidth communication environments. However,
most of the existing short signature schemes are only based on one intractable
assumption, such as bilinear pairing [2,3,4] and RSA [5]. Recently, to enhance
the security of short signatures, Su [6] presented an ID-based short signature
scheme based on knapsack and bilinear pairing. He claimed that his scheme is
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provably secure in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, in this paper, we will
show that an adversary can forge a signature on any message in Su’s signature
scheme. That is Su’s scheme is not secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some
preliminaries used throughout the paper. We review Su’s enhanced short sig-
nature scheme in Section 3 and analyze its security in Section 4, respectively.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear pairing
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of the same prime order q. We will view G1
as an additive group and G2 as a multiplicative group. A bilinear pairing is a
map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following three properties.
1. Bilinearity: For all a, b ∈ Z and P,Q ∈ G1, the map e : G1 × G1 → G2
satisfies e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: There are P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all
P,Q ∈ G1.
2.2 Knapsack problem
The knapsack problem or subset-sum problem is to determine, given a set of
positive integers W = {w1, w2, · · · , wn, t}, whether there is subset of the set
{wi}
n
i=1 such that it sums to t. Formally, the problem is equivalent to determining
whether there is a set X = {x1, x2, · · · , xn} such that
n∑
i=1
xiwi = t, xi ∈ {0, 1}.
2.3 ID-based signatures
An ID-based signature scheme consists of the following four probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms:
Setup. On input a security parameter k, the PKG generates a master secret
key MSK and the public parameters PP .
Extract. On input a user’s identity ID and the master secret key MSK, this
algorithm outputs a secret key skID for ID. The user’s public key is deter-
mined by his identity ID.
Sign. On input a message m and the secret key skID of the signer ID, this
algorithm outputs a signature σ on m.
Verify. On input a signature σ, a message m and an identity ID, it returns 1
if σ is a valid signature, and returns 0 otherwise.
3 Review of Su’s signature scheme
In this section, we review Su’s signature scheme [6]. The scheme is described as
follows:
Setup. Given a security parameter k, the PKG chooses two groups G1 and G2
of the same prime order q as well as a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2. It
also chooses a random generator P of G1, the master secret key s ∈ Z
∗
q and
a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q . Afterwards, the PKG sets QS = sP as
the master public key of the system and publishes the public parameters
PP = (G1,G2, e, P,QS , H).
Extract. On input the master secret key s and an identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, the
user with identity ID ∈ Z∗q chooses a random value skID ∈ Z
∗
q as his secret
key and publishes his public key QID = ID × skID ×QS.
Sign. On input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the signer ID with private key skID
does the following steps:
1. Choose two random vectorsB = (b1P, b2P, · · · , bnP ) andX = (x1, x2, · · · , xn),
where bi ∈ Z
∗
q , xi ∈ {0, 1}.
2. Compute ai = bi × skID (mod q) for each i ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
3. Compute U =
∑n
i=1 xibiP and V = λ
∑n
i=1 xiaiP , where λ = H(m).
4. Output the signature σ = (U, V ).
Verify. On input a signature σ = (U, V ), a message m and an identity ID as
well as the corresponding public key QID, a verifier computes λ = H(m)
and then checks if
e(U,QID)
λ = e(V,QS)
ID.
If so, he accepts the signature; otherwise, he rejects it.
The correctness of the signature can be verified as follows:
e(U,QID)
λ = e(
n∑
i=1
xibiP, ID × skID ×QS)
λ
= e(
n∑
i=1
xiaiP, ID ×QS)
λ
= e(λ
n∑
i=1
xiaiP,QS)
ID
= e(V,QS)
ID
Remark 1. We can see that, in Su’s signature scheme, a verifier cannot confirm
a user’s public key from its identity since the user’s public key involves a ran-
dom secret value. Therefore, Su’s signature scheme is not a standard ID-based
signature scheme.
Remark 2. We also note that Su’s scheme is not a certificateless signature
scheme [7]. In a certificateless signature scheme, the secret key of a user is a
combination of his partial private key generated by the PKG and some secret
value chosen by the user himself.
4 Security analysis on Su’s signature scheme
Su [6] claimed that his signature scheme is secure in the random oracle model.
However, he didn’t give a formal proof of the scheme. In this section, we will
present two forgery attacks on his signature scheme and show that his scheme is
insecure. In the first attack, a polynomial time adversary A, who has received a
valid signature with respect to the user with identity ID, can forge a signature
on any new message for the same user ID. In the second attack, we will show
that the adversary A is also able to forge a signature on any message for a new
user ID′.
4.1 Attack I
Assume that the adversary A aims to forge a signature on m∗ with respect
to the user with identity ID. After receiving ID’s valid signature σ = (U, V )
on message m. A makes two hash queries to obtain the values λ = H(m) and
λ∗ = H(m∗). Then he sets U∗ = U and V ∗ = λ
∗
λ
V , and outputs σ∗ = (U∗, V ∗)
as a signature on m∗. We can verify its validity as follows:
e(V ∗, QS)
ID = e(
λ∗
λ
V,QS)
ID
=
(
e(V,QS)
ID
)λ∗
λ
=
(
e(U,QID)
λ
)λ∗
λ
= e(U,QID)
λ∗
= e(U∗, QID)
λ∗
4.2 Attack II
Due to there is no authentication information for a user’s public key, an adversary
can replace any user’s public key with a value of his choice. Here we show that
the adversary A is also able to forge a signature on m∗ with respect to another
identity ID′.
After receiving ID’s valid signature σ = (U, V ) on message m. A makes two
hash queries to obtain the values λ = H(m) and λ∗ = H(m∗). Then he sets
QID′ =
ID′
ID
QID, U
∗ = U and V ∗ = λ
∗
λ
V , and outputs σ∗ = (U∗, V ∗) as a
signature on m∗ with respect to the user ID′. We can verify the validity of the
signature as follows:
e(V ∗, QS)
ID′ = e(
λ∗
λ
V,QS)
ID′
=
(
e(V,QS)
ID
) ID′×λ∗
ID×λ
=
(
e(U,QID)
λ
) ID′×λ∗
ID×λ
= e(U,
ID′
ID
QID)
λ∗
= e(U∗, QID′)
λ∗
The two attacks demonstrate that, in Su’s signature scheme, anyone can forge
a valid signature on any message with respect to any identity as long as he has
obtained one valid signature. Therefore, Su’s signature scheme is not secure.
5 Conclusion
Recently, Su [6] presented an enhanced short signature scheme and claimed that
it is secure in the random oracle model. In this paper, however, we have demon-
strated that an adversary can forge a signature on any message with respect to
any identity. In other words, Su’s signature scheme is not secure.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the Major Research Plan of the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (No. 90818005), the National Natural Science Foun-
dation of China (No. 60903217), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Cen-
tral Universities (No. WK0110000027), and the Natural Science Foundation of
Jiangsu Province of China (No. BK2011357).
References
1. Shamir A. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In: Proceedings
of advances in cryptology–CRYPTO’85. LNCS, vol. 196. Springer-Verlag; 1985. p.
47–53.
2. Boneh D, Lynn B, Shacham H. Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing. In: Pro-
ceedings of advances in cryptology–ASIACRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2248. Springer-
Verlag; 2001. p. 514–532.
3. Boneh D, Boyen X. Short Signatures Without Random Oracles. In: Proceedings
of advances in cryptology–EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027. Springer-Verlag;
2004. p. 56–73.
4. Zhang F, Safavi-Naini R, Susilo W. An Efficient Signature Scheme from Bilinear
Pairings and Its Applications. In: Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop
on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography (PKC’04). LNCS, vol. 2947.
Springer-Verlag; 2004. p. 277–290.
5. Hohenberger S, Waters B. Short and stateless signatures from the RSA assump-
tion. In: Proceedings of advances in cryptology–CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677.
Springer-Verlag; 2009. p. 654–670.
6. Su PC. Enhanced short signature scheme with hybrid problems. Computers &
Electrical Engineering 2011;37(2):174–179.
7. Al-Riyami S, Paterson K. Certificateless public key cryptography. In: Proceedings
of advances in cryptology–ASIACRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2894. Springer-Verlag;
2003. p. 452–473.
